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I. Introduction
In 2004, in the pages of this journal, Hussein Samatar put a human face 
on the difficulties that challenge Somali business owners in Minnesota. 
He also provided an overview of the impressive accomplishments of 
these industrious individuals. Here, we identify what has improved 
since 2004 and the challenges that remain. To do this, we use findings 
from a survey of 135 Twin City business owners (90 Somali owners 
and 45 non-Somali owners).
We find that Somali business owners are optimistic about their long-
term success. They tend to have plenty of informal experience with 
entrepreneurship through their parents, other family members, or 
friends. Somali business owners, especially those with street-front busi-
nesses, now talk regularly to each other, and this can provide another 
source of informal learning. In addition to the benefits of knowledge 
picked up informally through family or other business owners, Somali 
entrepreneurs appear to make excellent use of formal training (if they 
have had it) in their business practices. Less encouraging, we find that 
several problems identified by Samatar persist. Few Somali business 
owners have written business plans. In our sample, less than half of 
the Somali entrepreneurs in suuqs (malls) had bank accounts for their 
businesses. The percentage of Somali entrepreneurs who borrow from 
formal financial institutions, such as banks, is miniscule. Market satu-
ration is still a huge factor, limiting business growth and increasing the 
risk of business failure. In the next several sections, we elaborate on 
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these findings and assess how far the Twin Cities are from the goal of 
widespread, successful Somali businesses.
A few cautionary notes are in order before we begin our discussion. 
We have information only on ongoing businesses and solely those in 
the Twin Cities. We infer that certain business practices create greater 
risk of business failure, based on Samatar’s and other’s discussions of 
good business practices. At this point, however, we cannot definitively 
link the traits we find with the actual success or failure of the busi-
nesses we studied. Over the course of the next several years, we will 
follow the fortunes of the business owners initially surveyed to deter-
mine who achieves the goal of continuous profitability.
II. Background
Hussein Samatar estimated in 2004 that there were 550 Somali-owned 
businesses in Minnesota. In the ensuing years, that number has grown. 
In the Twin Cities metro area alone, we identified 129 Somali-owned 
street-front businesses and an additional 245 Somali-owned businesses 
within suuqs. The prolific establishment of businesses by Somalis in 
Minnesota is a remarkable achievement. Yet, Somali business owners 
face potential problems that can severely limit the long-term success of 
their individual enterprises and drain resources from the Somali com-
munity as a whole.
To learn more about Somali entrepreneurial achievements and chal-
lenges, we administered surveys to 90 Somali business owners and 45 
non-Somali business owners from June 2008 to May 2009. The latter 
were matched to Somali enterprises by the geographical location of 
their businesses and the length of time they had been in operation. 
We refer to these latter business owners as the “control group.” We 
sampled approximately 38 percent of all Somali street-front businesses 
in the Twin Cities and 17 percent of Somali businesses within malls. A 
complete description of our methodology is available in the Appendix.
We organize our discussion around the following issues: (1) plan-
ning, (2) relationships with financial institutions, (3) customers and 
customer relations, (4) sources of information/support networks, and 
(5) business owners’ outlooks. These categories track issues raised by 
Samatar to the extent our data allows.
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III. Planning
One concern raised by Samatar was a lack of planning among Somali 
business owners. Samatar narrated the stories of individuals who 
started businesses with little knowledge of the product they were sell-
ing or the customers they had to reach. He gave the specific example of 
partners who bought a restaurant without considering menus, portion 
costs, pricing, equipment, sanitation, and a host of other crucial issues. 
He also noted that Somali retail businesses were too often competing to 
sell virtually identical products to the same group of potential custom-
ers. Thus, one of the questions we considered in our survey is whether 
Somali business owners are now showing signs of greater preparation 
prior to investment.
The results were mixed. (See Table 1) Clearly, too many goods chas-
ing too few customers remains a major concern. A substantial majority 
(88 percent) of Somali business owners report that too much competi-
tion for their products or services is a serious problem, compared to 
just 36 percent of control group owners. Similarly, among individuals 
who want to grow their businesses, Somali business owners are much 
more likely than control group members to cite market saturation as a 
barrier to growth: 93 percent and 38 percent, respectively.
In an attempt to understand how so many Somali businesses end 
up in this situation, we considered differences between Somali entre-
preneurs who report market saturation as a problem and those that 
do not. Somali business owners in malls reported market saturation 
slightly more frequently than street-front business owners, but the 
difference was not statistically significant. A more important factor 
appears to be the nature of support networks. For example, business 
Table 1. Differences In Planning, Sample Versus Control Group
 Somali Control Group
 Business Owners Business owners
Too much competition for 
products/services business provides* 88% 36%
Market saturation is a barrier to growth* 93% 38%
Has written business plan* 30% 64%
Among those with written business
plans, percentage who received
professional support in preparing it* 59% 17%
*Indicates the relationship is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or lower.
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owners who consulted non-Somali friends about opening a business 
were significantly less likely to report problems with market satura-
tion. Not surprisingly, the broader the range of individuals consulted 
about opening a business, the better the business’ ability to target a 
unique customer base. Overall, it appears that market saturation con-
tinues to plague Somali entrepreneurs. Broad consultation with a wide 
variety of individuals prior to opening a business may be one way to 
avoid this problem.
Market saturation can be evidence of poor planning. A written busi-
ness plan, in contrast, is evidence of forethought. It indicates that entre-
preneurs have given significant attention to the best ways to make 
their businesses profitable. Although most Somali business owners 
are not preparing business plans before opening their enterprises, our 
evidence indicates that a significant minority is creating them. Among 
those surveyed, 30 percent of Somali business owners had a written 
business plan. This compares to 64 percent of control group owners. 
There is still a long way to go in educating Twin City entrepreneurs of 
all backgrounds about the benefits of written business plans, but it is a 
positive sign that nearly one-third of Somali business owners already 
have them.
Furthermore, the results look even better when examined closely. 
Samatar noted that the most useful business plans must be developed 
in consultation with professionals. In this regard, Somalis with busi-
ness plans fare better than their control group counterparts. Among 
Somalis with business plans, 59 percent had worked with profession-
als to develop their plans, while among control group members with 
business plans, only 18 percent had worked with professionals. So we 
conclude that, if Somalis do create business plans, they make the effort 
to do them correctly. In fact, the percentage of Somali business own-
ers with professionally guided written business plans is comparable to the 
percentage of control group owners with the same. A significant por-
tion of Somali owners may be approaching their enterprises with more 
forethought than was true in 2004. The next step is to extend these 
good business practices to more individuals.
IV. Relationships with Financial Institutions
Samatar identified mistrust of the American banking system among 
many Somalis, which leads to negative consequences for businesses. 
There are pitfalls to raising money primarily through personal sav-
ings, family, and friends. When businesses begin with this foundation, 
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they tend to be undercapitalized. In addition, family and friends rarely 
insist on a careful outside review of business projects—an essential 
prerequisite to loans from financial institutions. Even within ongoing 
Somali businesses, Samatar noted in 2004 that cash flow, income, and 
balance sheet statements were rare.
We considered the extent of these problems in the current period 
and found that Somali business owners are still significantly less likely 
to have relationships with formal financial institutions than other busi-
ness owners. (See Table 2) Although 27 percent of Somali business own-
ers reported borrowing money as a source of start-up capital, the vast 
majority borrowed informally from family, friends, or other individu-
als. Many more control group members reported borrowing money to 
start their enterprises (64 percent), and more than half of their borrow-
ing was from financial institutions. Nonprofit organizations, such as 
the African Development Center (ADC), headed by Hussein Samatar, 
provide a promising alternative to traditional institutional lenders. Our 
data is inconclusive concerning the extent to which these organizations 
are being used by Somali entrepreneurs, but we suspect that that their 
use is widespread. Hopefully, the ability of these organizations to pro-
vide funding, accompanied by advice and oversight, will continue to 
increase.
Another consequence of mistrusting U.S. banks may be the low inci-
dence of business bank accounts among Somali entrepreneurs. Samatar 
noted in 2004 that many Somali businesses operated solely on a cash 
basis. He explained how this could get businesses in trouble with state 
and federal tax authorities, and that businesses with such accounting 
systems will never secure term loans from financial institutions. Bank 
accounts make record keeping and formal accounting easier and more 
transparent.
Table 2. Differences In Relationships With Financial Institutions,
Sample Versus Control Group
 Somali Control Group
 Business Owners Business owners
Borrowed money to finance business* 27% 64%
Borrowed from a financial institution, 
not family or friends* 4% 51%
Uses bank accounts for business* 70% 96%
*Indicates the relationship is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or lower.
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To assess the extent of this problem, we asked survey respondents 
whether they had bank accounts for their businesses. We learned that 
nearly all (96 percent) of control group business owners, but only about 
two-thirds (70 percent) of Somali business owners, maintained bank 
accounts for their enterprises. Malls and street-front businesses were 
very different along this dimension. Less than half of Somali business 
owners operating in a suuq had bank accounts (49 percent), compared 
to 88 percent of street-front business owners. In other words, among 
Somalis operating a street-front business, the rate of bank account use 
was more comparable to control group business owners. Somalis oper-
ating in malls were far behind the other two groups. The lack of bank 
accounts leaves the mall businesses vulnerable to accounting irregu-
larities and bookkeeping difficulties.
Again, the ADC has been actively involved in improving this situa-
tion. The organization has worked with social service and government 
agencies to create bank accounts and financing options for business 
owners that are compliant with Islamic law. The ADC has been at the 
national forefront in developing Sharia-compliant alternative lending, 
based on the resale of assets at a profit, rather than receiving interest 
payments. This may explain, at least in part, why so many street-
front businesses are operating through the formal banking system. 
Our results suggest that the ADC’s continued work in this area is very 
important for increasing the integrity of Somali enterprises in malls.
V. Customers and Customer Relations
Migrant businesses that can attract native-born as well as immigrant 
customers are the most likely to succeed.1 In the Twin Cities, appeal-
ing to other recent immigrant groups, such as Oromos and Sudanese, 
will also be important. And, of course, most Somali business owners 
want other Somalis to feel comfortable in their businesses. One of the 
most successful businesspersons identified by Samatar in 2004 tried to 
appeal to customers of all ethnic and national backgrounds, and this 
was a key reason for the significant business achievements. On the 
other hand, Samatar was concerned that most Somali business own-
ers would be unable to cope with non-Somali customers, if any should 
appear before them.
To explore this issue in greater depth, we first asked owners if 
they targeted their businesses to particular customers. (See Table 3) 
Just eight percent of Somali business owners report that they gear 
Shannon Golden, Yasīn Garad, and Elizabeth Heger Boyle
95
their products or services toward a particular group of customers, 
compared to over half (53 percent) of control group business owners. 
Despite these intentions, Somalis comprise the majority of clients for 
Somali-owned businesses. On average, Somalis make up 74 percent of 
the clientele for the Somali business owners in the sample. Once again, 
street-front businesses fare better than businesses in suuqs. There is a 
statistically significant difference between mall and street-front busi-
nesses, with Somalis making up an average of 82 percent of mall cli-
ents but just 68 percent of street-front business clients.
There are many factors that go into making customers comfortable 
with a new business. One factor is whether the business follows the 
pattern of interaction that a customer expects. This can create difficul-
ties for Somali business owners because different customers may have 
different expectations. For example, a white, native-born woman from 
Edina may expect to walk through aisles of products, all of which have 
clearly marked prices. She may be unprepared for a shopping style 
that requires direct interaction with a business owner who takes items 
off displays and presents them to her. She may be unable to assign 
value to items that have no price tags and she may be uncomfortable 
negotiating prices. On the other hand, Somali customers may insist on 
direct interaction with the owners of small businesses and view price 
negotiations as an essential part of that transaction.
Focusing on one element of owner-customer interactions, we asked 
business owners whether they routinely negotiate prices with custom-
ers. We found that more Somali business owners negotiate prices than 
do the control group owners. Forty-nine percent of Somali respon-
Table 3. Customers and Customer Relations, 
Sample Versus Control Group
 Somali Control Group
 Business Owners Business owners
Products or services are oriented towards a 
particular group of clients* 8% 53%
Average percent of clients who are Somali 74% n/a
Routinely provide customer credit* 24% 47%
Never provides customer credit* 32% 36%
Routinely negotiates prices* 49% 27%
No bank accounts, providing credit is 
routine, AND negotiation over price 
is routine* 12% 0%
*Indicates the relationship is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or lower.
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dents routinely negotiate prices compared to just 27 percent of non-
Somali respondents. The relatively high level of negotiation by Somali 
business owners may discourage certain non-Somali customers from 
entering Somali-owned stores.
Negotiating prices with customers can also indicate informality and 
may make it more difficult for business owners to develop stable cash 
flow and financial projections for the future. Other factors, such as the 
location of businesses and the availability of free or low-cost parking, 
are also likely to influence the customer base of Somali-owned enter-
prises. These are important considerations for insuring the long-term 
viability of businesses.
Another element of client relations discussed by Samatar was the 
provision of credit. Samatar provided the example of a restaurant that 
paid its suppliers within 15 to 30 days of receiving goods. However, 
the restaurant was routinely extending credit to its customers, who 
tended to pay in 45 to 60 days. This created serious cash flow prob-
lems for the business. We are cautiously optimistic that this situation 
has improved. Our surveys show that some Somali business owners 
routinely provide credit to their customers (24 percent), but this is 
less common than it is among non-Somali business owners (about 47 
percent). (These percentages do not include credit card transactions.) 
Samatar’s example suggests the collection of debt may be more of an 
issue than the extension of credit. Unfortunately, our data do not pro-
vide information on that particular issue.
The combination of no bank account, the routine provision of credit, 
and commonly negotiating prices makes businesses particularly vul-
nerable to problems. Such attributes make it more difficult for business 
owners to track debt, collect overdue accounts, or plan for the future. 
While none of the control group business owners had this combina-
tion of factors, 12 percent of Somali business owners reported no bank 
accounts, regular provision of credit, and routine negotiation of prices. 
We would expect these businesses to be particularly vulnerable to fail-
ure.
VI. Formal and Informal Sources of Information
Are Somali business owners cooperating and sharing information? 
Networks are important for providing positive support for new busi-
nesses.2 Samatar was concerned that mistrust may have been impeding 
such dialogue in 2004. He suggested this lack of collaboration could be 
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particularly harmful for business owners in malls because it provided 
an opportunity for exploitation by landlords.
Both good news and bad news emerge from our data on this front. 
(See Table 4) The good news is that Somali entrepreneurs talk to other 
business owners at a rate similar to control group members (60 and 
58 percent, respectively). Additional good news is that Somali street-
front business owners are more likely to talk to other business owners 
than control group business owners. The bad news relates to mall 
businesses. While 72 percent of street-front store owners talk regu-
larly with other business people, just 46 percent of mall business own-
ers engage in that activity. Notably, market saturation not only hurts 
profits, it also undermines communication. Somali business owners 
concerned about competition were significantly less likely to report 
that they talk regularly to other business owners than those who said 
market saturation was not a major problem. Mistrust and competition 
among business owners in malls lead to an environment of isolation 
rather than cooperation.
Turning to other types of networks, about the same percentage of 
Somali business owners (43 percent) and owners in the control group 
(42 percent) reported having partners. While partners can be beneficial 
in business, Samatar noted that most Somali business partnerships are 
informal, thus leading to a “revolving door of partners” that can actu-
ally drain resources from the community and the business. Somalis 
also tended to identify family networks as a source of motivation to 
begin their businesses. While 71 percent of Somali business owners 
indicated that their primary caretaker when they were growing up was 
an entrepreneur, only 29 percent of the control group said the same. 
Table 4. Differences In Informal and Formal Support, 
Sample Versus Control Group
 Somali Control Group
 Business Owners Business owners
Talks to other owners regularly 60% 58%
Has business partners 43% 42%
Primary caretaker was self-employed* 32% 36%
Routinely negotiates prices* 71% 29%
Family experience made entrepreneurship 
come naturally* 71% 47%
Has business-related training* 40% 62%
*Indicates the relationship is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or lower.
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This affected the motivation to become an entrepreneur. Seventy-one 
percent of Somalis reported that the knowledge gained through their 
family’s experience with entrepreneurship made starting their own 
business come more naturally. Only 47 percent of the control group 
made such a claim.
Turning to more formal networks, the Somali business owners in 
our sample were less likely than members of the control group to have 
had training, such as workshops or seminars, related to running a 
business. Forty percent of Somali entrepreneurs had business training, 
compared to 62 percent of control group owners. Training has impor-
tant benefits so this discrepancy represents a serious problem.
For example, among Somali business owners in the sample, those 
who have had business training are less likely to report being in dan-
ger of failing in the last three years. Nearly half (48 percent) of those 
without business training have been in danger of failing, while just 27 
percent of those with business training report being near failure.
VII. Owners’ Assessments and Outlooks
Somalis are generally optimistic. Compared to control group entre-
preneurs, they anticipate fewer problems and make more positive 
assessments of their businesses and their abilities. Samatar, however, 
provides a cautionary note:
The nearly universal belief among Somali entrepreneurs that they will 
become rich very quickly if they can only open a business often leads 
them to jump into a business venture without thinking it through. While 
this underscores great creative energy and a strong work ethic, it is also 
a source of overconfidence that overlooks the necessary preparation for 
a venture.
We find support for Samatar’s argument that optimism and overconfi-
dence may be linked for some Somali business owners. (See Table 5)
First, Somali business owners were less likely than control group 
owners to indicate they were in danger of failing at some point during 
the last three years (41 percent of Somalis versus 56 percent of the con-
trol group). While this may be a positive indication of the relative suc-
cess of Somali businesses compared to non-Somali businesses in their 
neighborhoods, it may also indicate that Somalis wear rose-colored 
glasses when they assess their businesses.
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Samatar also suggested that Somali entrepreneurs did not incor-
porate government regulations into their planning, which can lead 
to problems. For example, Samatar provided the story of business 
owners who sought to add a coffee shop to their existing retail space. 
They ran into headaches when the contractor they hired to remodel 
the space failed to acquire the necessary city construction permits. In 
another example, Somalis bought a gas station without realizing it was 
under investigation by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. The 
rules and regulations governing businesses are complex and multi-
layered in the United States and “ignorance of the law is no excuse” for 
violations. Entrepreneurs who open businesses without an awareness 
of these rules and regulations do so at their peril.
Our study provides evidence that this may still be a problem. If 
business owners indicated their business had been in danger of failing 
in the last three years, we asked them to identify the significant prob-
lems facing their businesses. In response, 33 percent of control group 
owners cited problems with rules and regulations. In contrast, only 
10 percent of Somali owners cited rules and regulations as a proxi-
mate cause of their business troubles. Given the background provided 
by Samatar, we see these figures—which might at first blush seem 
encouraging—as troubling. These statistics may indicate that Somali 
business owners are not fully informed about the legal requirements 
that govern their enterprises. For business owners who are, or recently 
were, on the brink of failure, some type of code violation may well 
push them over the edge.
Somali business owners tend to think their businesses are doing 
well. They may be right or they may be overconfident. Our planned 
follow-up study of these businesses will allow us to assess which con-
clusion is true.
Table 5. Differences In Outlook, Sample Versus Control Group
 Somali Control Group
 Business Owners Business owners
Business has been in danger of failing in 
last three years* 41% 56%
Among those who report their business 
has been in danger of failing, percent 
reporting that understanding rules and 
regulations is a major problem* 10% 33%
*Indicates the relationship is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, or lower.
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VIII. Conclusion
“Ethnic economies,” or vibrant retail centers that attract customers 
of all types with the authentic food and products of a particular eth-
nic group, can buffer new immigrants from the unfamiliarity of the 
receiving society, facilitate their economic adaptation, help mobilize 
capital, control co-ethnic spending, provide a familiar kinship network 
structure, and promote values or norms that lead to economic achieve-
ment.3 They can motivate the location of new immigrants and assist 
the second generation by providing employment, routes to manage-
ment or ownership, and respect for educational achievements acquired 
outside the United States.4
Although not yet an ethnic economy, the Somali business commu-
nity in the Twin Cities can provide some of the same benefits on a 
smaller scale. It can offer job opportunities to young people in the 
Somali community. Successful business owners can also share their 
experiences and increase the chance of success for others. The com-
munity can work with city officials to make the unique retail niche of 
Somalis a draw for out-of-town visitors. Many of the same benefits 
that ethnic economies attract can accrue to the smaller ethnic retail 
niche provided by Somalis in the Twin Cities if the necessary support 
is forthcoming.
The study related here increases our understanding of the experi-
ences of Somali entrepreneurs and the strategies that may be most 
effective in helping them overcome challenges. Clearly, nonprofit orga-
nizations, such as the ADC, are necessary in order to educate business 
owners to identify their vulnerabilities and address them effectively. 
These organizations can also provide start-up and ongoing capital that 
is compliant with the religious beliefs of Somali business owners. It 
is also essential that government officials work with members of the 
Somali community to facilitate business successes. It is in the interest 
of all inhabitants of the Twin Cities for Somali enterprises to thrive.
*The authors would like to thank Hussein Samatar of the Afri-
can Development Center and Richard Todd of the Federal Reserve 
of Minneapolis for their initial feedback on the survey. Neither the 
African Development Center nor the Federal Reserve was involved in 
the administration of the survey or the analysis of the data. Opinions 
expressed herein are solely our own. We would also like to thank Katy 
Fodness for contributions in the early stages of the project. The project 
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the University of Minnesota.
Notes
1. Light and Gold 2000.
2. Burt 2000; and Waldinger, Aldrich, and Ward 2000.
3. Wilson and Martin 1982; and Zhou 1992.
4. Portes and Rumbaut 2006.
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Appendix
The Surveys
In-person surveys for business owners were created to determine 
entrepreneurs’ pathways to business ownership, backgrounds, financ-
ing opportunities, and social networks. To administer the surveys, the 
co-authors approached businesses and scheduled a convenient time 
for conducting each survey. Interviewers spoke only to the owners 
of establishments. They administered all surveys in person. For the 
Somali participants, the surveys were administered in Somali or Eng-
lish, according to the respondent’s preference. For the control group, 
the surveys were administered in English. Depending on the complex-
ity of the business and the number of distractions, the surveys took 45 
minutes to 3 hours to complete. Business owners were paid a small fee 
for their participation.
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Sampling
We compiled a list of Somali-owned businesses in Minneapolis and St. 
Paul based on: (1) Minnesota State Department filings; (2) local phone-
books (general and featuring African businesses); (3) conversations 
with key informants; (4) newspaper articles and advertisements from 
general circulation and Somali newspapers; (5) key word searches 
on the Internet; and (6) observations at the primary locations where 
Somali-owned businesses operate (identifying businesses on the street 
and within office buildings). Using these methods, we identified 129 
street-front businesses in addition to six malls. We divided street-front 
businesses into seven zip code zones and surveyed one-half of the 
businesses in each zone. This created a sample of 59 street-front busi-
nesses. Each of the malls encompassed 16 to 111 business stalls for a 
total of 245 additional businesses. Within the malls, our goal was to 
interview the owner in each eighth stall, although this turned out to be 
difficult in practice and the first author sometimes had to resort to con-
venience sampling within the malls—approaching entrepreneurs who 
were willing to speak with him. This added 31 surveys to the sample. 
The street-front sample and the mall sample combined create a total 
sample of 90 Somali business owners.
To generate the control group, we drew a sample of geographically 
matched businesses not owned by Somalis or other migrants for every 
second Somali-business-owner interview conducted. Non-migrant-
owned businesses founded or acquired before 1995 were excluded, to 
more closely match the characteristics of the Somali businesses, all of 
which began after 1995. The control sample includes 45 native-born 
business owners.
